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This committee, after our study, declares that our present system of
workers' compensation legislation is still fundamentally sound in
concept.
- Report to the House of Assembly of the Select Committee on
Workers' Compensation, May, 1981
In the last decade health and safety issues in the workplace have
gained a special prominence. Across North America new initiatives
have been taken in response to an old problem. One aspect subjected
to re-evaluation in many jurisdictions is the statutory scheme of
workers' compensation. In Nova Scotia a Select Committee of the
Legislature was given the mandate to reassess this scheme, and its
overall verdict after two years of study was that only tinkering is
required. Is that a fair conclusion? The question is much more than a
purely academic one, since it is expected that the Select Committee's
report will form the basis of new legislation in Nova Scotia. The
adequacy of that legislative response will have immediate and signifi-
cant relevance to injured workers in this province.
To assess the present scheme it is obviously necessary to under-
stand it, and a historical perspective provides the best insight into
why the scheme looks the way it does. Current workers' compensa-
tion legislation is fundamentally the same as it was in 1915, when a
statutory scheme was born of compromise between employers and
employees. But while an understanding of that historical comprom-
ise is crucial, it need not be accepted as an essential ingredient in 1981.
The most basic question to be asked about workers' compensation is
whether that historical compromise has any continuing validity, and
it is to that question that this paper is directed. In particular, this
paper will focus on one of the most important features of the scheme
from the perspective of injured workers - the scope of compensation.
* LL.B. Dalhousie, 1982. This paper was submitted in partial fulfilment of the require-
ments for the Employment Law course at Dalhousie Law School. The law surveyed is
current to December, 1981.
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This paper will proceed, firstly, by tracing the emergence of
workers' compensation, and then situating that development in the
context of the present. The main body of this paper will consist of an
analysis of a variety of issues related to the basis upon which compen-
sation is, and/or should be, awarded. Once this task is completed, a
few concluding remarks will be offered.
II. The Emergence of Workers' Compensation
At the turn of the century a worker injured on thejob in Nova Scotia
had to look to the common law for redress. Quite apart from the fact
that financial considerations made access to the courts difficult for
employees, the tort remedy was not a very satisfactory one for
workers. In the first place, the worker had to prove that the employer
had been at fault. This was no easy task given the standard of
negligence in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the emergence of fault
as a standard of liability had coincided with the coming of the
industrial revolution, and was quite clearly designed to insulate the
new industrialists from responsibility for industrial accidents.' In
addition, the common law afforded the employer very powerful
defences even where fault on the part of the employer had been
demonstrated. At this stage the doctrine of contributory negligence
imposed an absolute bar to recovery, even if the plaintiff's degree of
fault were very small.2 Furthermore, the common law denied recov-
ery where there had been a voluntary assumption of risk. In the
employment context this concept was given a very broad interpreta-
tion; the employee was deemed to have voluntarily accepted a wide
range of risks as an implied term of his employment contract.
3
Finally, the common law developed the doctrine of common
employment (or fellow servant rule) which precluded recovery where
the cause of the injury had been the fault of another employee.4 An
underlying theme of this trilogy of defences was the fiction that the
worker had some control over his working conditions. The conse-
quence was that it was usually the worker himself who shouldered the
blame for, and the cost of, an industrial accident. It was very rare for
a worker to succeed in a tort claim against his employer, although the
1. .. G. Fl gtit, The Law of Torts (5th ed., Sydttey, Attstralia: The Lam Book
Company, 1977) at 102-103.
2. Id. at 489 (The statutory change of this rule, providing for apportionment, was first
introduced in Nova Scotia in 1925; the Contributory Negligence Act, 1925, S.N.S. 1925,
c. 5; rep. & sub. by the Contributory Negligence Act, 1926, S.N.S. 1926, c. 3)
3. Fleming, supra, note 1 at 486-489.
4. Id. at 489.
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incidence of industrial accidents was very high. 5 The carnage among
workers was a cost of production which employers, for the most part,
did not have to bear.
It was a situation that cried out for legislative intervention. The
legislative response was initially quite modest. "The Employere Lia-
bility for Injuries Act" was adopted in Nova Scotia in 19006, based on
the 1880 English act.7 This act attempted to remove the special
hurdles faced by employees, compared to other plaintiffs, 8 but it was
still fundamentally a fault based system. 9 Monetary limits on recov-
ery were set for any action under the act. 10 The act allowed an option
of suing at common law, requiring the worker to elect between the act
and a common law action. II The courts remained the forum in which
the worker sought redress. 12 "The Employers' Liability for Injury
Act" was only a slight improvement upon the common law, and
within a decade it was pronounced inadequate and superceded by
N' ova Sr-of's ifist w ow kem' tompensation act.
The "Nova Scotia Workmen's Compensation Act", passed in
1910, 13 was significantly different from the scheme of workers' com-
pensation which would ultimately take hold. The 19 10 act continued
to make employers liable on an individual basis. 14 It did, however,
make a significant advance by imposing liability without proof of
fault by the employer.' 5 The statute fixed a scale of compensation
based on workers' previous earnings, with a statutory limit of $1500
in compensation.' 6 For fatal accidents the act contemplated a lump
sum payment; 7 for other accidents the employer was required to pay
compensation on a weekly basis.' 8 Any dispute about the employer's
5. Alexander H. McKinnon, Commissioner, Report Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission (Halifax, 1958) at 3-5.
6. S.N.S. 1900, c. 1.
7. McKinnon, supra, note 5, at 5.
8. S.N.S. 1900, c. 1, s. 3.
9. S.N.S. 1900, c. 1, ss. 3, 5.
10. S.N.S. 1900, c. 1, s. 6. The limit was $1500, or the worker's average salary overy the
last three years, whichever was greater.
11. S.N.S. 1900, c. 1, s. 16.
12. S.N.S. 1900, c. 1, s. 3
13. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3.
14. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3, s. 5.
15. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3,s.5. However, the right to compensation was disallowed where the
itwu was attributabte to the serious and wilful. miseodut ot d .wtknkn is o the
worker, s. 5(2) (c).
16. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3, First Schedule, s. (1).
17. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3, First Schedule, s. (1) (a). The amount of the lump sum paid to
dependents was $1,000, or the deceased's salary over the last three years from that
employer, whichever was larger, up to the $1500 maximum.
18. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3, First Schedule, s. (1) (b). The weekly payment was 50 percent of the
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liability under the act was resolved not in the ordinary courts but by
arbitration. 9 Again, the act did not take away the right to sue at
common law; it only stipulated than an employer could not be held
liable under both the act and at common law.20 The 1910 act was not
given time to be tested; it was shortly overtaken by other develop-
ments.
In 1910 the Chief Justice of Ontario, Sir William B. Meredith, had
been appointed by that province's government to head a Commis-
sion of Enquiry into workers' compensation. The Commissions
report was completed in 1914, and formed the basis for Ontario's
Workmen's Compensation Act, which became effective on January
1, 1915.21 Ontario's act served as a model for other Canadian provin-
ces, and Nova Scotia was quick to respond. In 1914 the Nova Scotia
government appointed its own commission to prepare a draft bill.2
The result was the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1915,23 based on
its Ontario counterpart, which became effective in 1917.24
The 1915 act reaffirmed the principle of the 1910 act that compen-
sation for work-related injuries and disease did not depend on proof
of fault.25 The only situation in which fault was relevant was in a case
where the injury was attributable solely to the serious and wilful
misconduct of the employee; such conduct normally disentitled the
worker to compensation.26 However, there was an exception to the
exception. Where death or serious and permanent disability resulted,
even wilful misconduct by the employee would not bar a claim for
compensation.27 In essence, the act imposed absolute liability for
work-related accidents.
worker's previous earnings, with payments not to exceed $7 per week, with an aggregate
total limit of $1500.
19. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3, s. 5(3).
20. S.N.S. 1910, c. 3, s. 5(2). If the employee sued at common law and lost, he still
retained his right to compensation under the act, subject to costs being assessed against
him for the common law action, s. 3(4).
21. Report to the House of Assembly of the Select Committee on Workers' Compensa-
lion (Nova Scotia, May, 1981) at 9. (Hereafter referred to as the Select Committee
Report).
22. An Act Respecting the Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers to Make
Compensation to their Employees for Injuries Received in the Course of their Employ-
ment, S.N.S. 1914, c. 9.
23. S.N.S. 1915, c. I (currently, Workers' Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, as am.)
24. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 9.
25. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, s. 7 (currently S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 7).
26. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, s. 7(2) (currently S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 7(1) (b)).
27. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, s. 7(2) (currently S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 7(1) (b)), i.e. the exception was
narrower than in the 1910 act, supra, note 15).
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Employers were made to shoulder this liability, but not, as before,
on an individual basis. The responsibility for paying the costs of
workers' compensation was imposed on employers on a collective
basis. Compensation was paid from an accident fund, financed by
assessments levied against all employers covered by the act. Employ-
ers were divided into classes, and the rate of assessment for each class
of industries was a function of the accident record of these industries.
The responsibility for levying these assessments and paying compen-
sation was entrusted to a new administrative agency, the Workmen's
Compensation Board.
28
The fundamental and underlying assumption of the scheme was
that it is employers who are responsible for injuries that occur on the
job. In much the same way that wages are a cost of production, so is
the cost of compensating injured workers. But this principle was
accepted only up to a point. There was to be compensation only for
loss of earnings, and to a limited extent, medical costs; there was to be
no compensation for pain and suffering or other non-pecuniary
losses. Furthermore, the compensation for loss of earning was well
below full compensation. 29 The compromise was clear. Workers
were offered a speedy remedy on a no fault basis in exchange for
being forced to accept only partial compensation.
A further concession was demanded of workers covered by the
act. Workers were denied the right to sue in tort both their own
employer, and any other employer covered by the act.30 Workers
who could have succeeded in a claim of negligence against their
employer were placed on an equal footing with injured workers who
could not prove fault. Both had to be satisfied with compensation
under the act. Employers were called upon to finance the statutory
scheme, but were relieved of tort liability.3'
In the context of 1915 workers probably got more from the
compromise than they lost. The tort remedy they were forced to give
up was then a poor one in any event. The alternative of workers'
compensation, although far from perfect, was interpreted as an
28. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, ss. 49-80 (currently S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, ss. 84-125).
29. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, ss. 35-48 (currently S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, ss. 30-71).
30. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, ss. 10, 11 (currently S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, ss. 15,16) Where therewas a
cause of action against a non-employer for work-related injury, there was an option of
suing at common law or claiming compensation under the act, s. 9 (currently s. 14).
31. Employers not covered by the act were obviously an exception to this rule.
Employees injured in a worksite not covered by the act had to resort to court; the standard
of liability was one of negligence. S.N.S. 1915, c. I Part II, ss. 84-89 (currently S.N.S.
1968, c. 65, Part II, ss. 160-164). Employees not covered by either Part I or Part II had to
resort to the common law alone.
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important achievement by workers. Nevertheless, it was an achieve-
ment to be built upon, and not one with which workers were entirely
satisfied. 32
111. Sixty-four Years Later
It has been 64 years since Nova Scotian workers lost their right to sue
their employers in tort in exchange for the right to workers' compen-
sation. In the interim the common law concept of negligence has
undergone a marked transformation. Negligence has become a very
broadly based head of liability, and the standard of fault has become
increasingly demanding of defendants, particularly manufacturers. 33
In jurisdictions where tort actions still lie against employers the
special common law defences have been whittled away 4 Looked at
in the context of the present, to deprive workers of their right to sue in
tort is to deprive them of a very signficant remedy. Have develop-
ments in workers' compensation kept pace with developments in
tort? There can be no dispute that the answer to that question is an
emphatic NO.
Throughout most of Canada the basic structure of workers' com-
pensation remains essentially the same as it was at the time of World
War I. In Nova Scotia there have been numerous amendments to the
statute; indeed there have been amendments passed almost every
year since 1915. But those amendments have represented only small
refinements. The underlying scheme remains intact.
Workers' compensation has begun to show the strains of being
called upon to adapt to new realities. In the 1910s the worker was
relieved of the requirement to show fault, but the requirement to
establish work-relatedness remained. In the 1980s it is recognized
that the requirement to prove work-relatedness can impose its own
straightjacket. Showing that an accident occurred on the job is
usually not difficult, but an effort to demonstrate that a disease is
work-related is still confronted by a wall of resistence. 35 Workers'
compensation has not yet really come to terms with the implications
32. A. King and N. McCombie, "Workers' Comp. Legal Right or Social Welfare", This
Magazine (15:1, Feb. -Mar., 1981) 34 at 36.
33. Fleming, supra, note I at 103 ff.
34. Id , at 486. Also, employees covered by Part II of the Workers' Compensation Act
are not subject to those special employer defences, S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, Part II, ss. 161, 162.
35. P. Weller, Reshaping Workers' Compensation for Ontario (Ontario, November,
1980) at 137-141 (hereafter referred to as the Weiler Report). The whole area ofindustrial
diseases is only briefly canvassed by Weiler, it will constitute a central focus of his second
report, forthcoming.
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of multiple causes, (only one of which is work-related), 36 nor has it
been ready to acknowledge the real incidence of occupational dis-
ease.37 Another problem area concerns the nature of the administra-
tive structure. In the 1910s an administrative board was the obvious
means of providing a fair and efficient way of operating the scheme.
In the 1980s the bureaucratization of the administrative machinery
has raised questions as to its efficacy.38 The system does not always
respond with dispatch. A third general area of concern centres on the
scale and type of compensation. In the 1910s the acceptance of only
partial compensation was part of the bargain. The question whether
that is a fair deal for workers in the 1980s is a question that cannot be
ignored. All of the above concerns merit examination and response.
In this paper, attention will be directed to only one, the last menti-
oned, the issues surrounding the basis on which compensation is
awarded.
The difficulties noted above have called for a re-evaluation of
workers' compensation. Governments have been prepared to acknow-
ledge that problems exist. To date, however, the response in Nova
Scotia has been limited. In May, 1979 the government proceeded to
constitute a Select Committee of the Legislature to undertake a
comprehensive review of workers' compensation in this province.
The Committee undertook its own investigations, held public hear-
ings, and submitted its report in May, 1981.39 The Select Committee's
Report bears the mark of a decidedly ad hoc approach. The Report
examines a number of issues, and articulates a series of recommenda-
tions, but it is difficult to detect a common thread. The approach is
not one of examining fundamental assumptions, and there is little
sign of an overall conceptual framework. There is no real effort to
start from first principles, and build upon that. The Report does deal
with several issues concerning the basis of compensation, issues
36. The act stipulates that compensation should be proportional to the contribution of
the work-related cause, S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 7(2). Such a provision was first introduced by
S.N.S. 1952, c. 56, s. 2. In contrast, tort liability has taken a more expansive approach.
The defendent is fully liable if the defendent is responsible for a material contribution to
the injury. McGhee v. National Coal Board, [1972] 3 ALL ER 1008 (H. L.).
37. In one case, that of coal miners, the Legislature has solved the problem of proving
causation by legislating automatic assumption. Any person who has been a coal miner for
twenty years and who suffers from a loss of lung function has a right to compensation.
S.N.S. 1981, c. 46, s. 1. This provision in effect deems a causal link without specific proof.
This legislative response is the exception that proves the rule, and represents only the tip
of the iceberg of occupational diseases.
38. Eg. submission of Mrs. Irene Hallett to the Nova Scotia Select Committte on
Workers' Compensation.
39. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21.
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which will be addressed below, but it does not do so in a particularly
comprehensive fashion.
Other jurisdictions have taken a more systematic approach to
reform. Quebec subjected its legislation to a major overhaul in
1978,40 Saskatchewan did so in the following year.41 Ontario is
currently in the midst of a comprehensive review. The Ontario
exercise is an interesting one to compare with Nova Scotia's. The
Ontario approach was to issue a White Paper in late 1979, and to
commission an academic study in 1980. Paul Weiler, former Chair-
man of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board, was given a
board mandate to review workers' compensation in Ontario. His first
Report was released in November, 1980.42 The Weiler Report is in
marked contrast to the Select Committee's Report. The Weiler
Report does attempt to examine first principles, and to develop a
philosophy of workers' compensation. For that reason the Weiler
Report is a very good reference point against which to assess issues in
workers' compensation. Weiler very clearly articulates his assump-
tions and outlines his preferred directions for change. Accordingly,
Weiler's approach will be examined in considerable detail in the
ensuing discussion.
IV The Basis of Compensation
The present analysis of issues concerning the basis of compensation
will proceed by an examination of the present system measured
against the critiques contained in the Select Committee Report and
in the Weiler Report. In addition, the analogy to personal injury
damages in tort will be explored in an effort to place the scheme of
workers' compensation in the context of the alternative foregone.
What should be the starting premise for any discussion of the
scope of compensation? The Select Committee Report gives the
following response:
There was agreement that the legislation should provide the most
comprehensive protection possible to the work force, consistent with
economic realities, i.e. that costs would be a direct charge upon
industry.43
The Select Committee Report does not really follow through on this
point. It neither discusses what full compensation would entail, nor
40. S. Q., 1978, c. 57.
41. S.S., 1979, C. W-17.1
42. See supra, note 35.
43. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 2.
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whether there are any barriers to its achievement. The present discus-
sion will attempt to do that, starting from the presumption that there
should be full compensation.
The presumption of full compensation is based on an assumption
that both the Select Committee44 and the Weiler Report 45 profess to
accept that workers' compensation is not a social assistance program
dependent upon society's good graces, but rather a right enjoyed
by all workers. A century ago the law deemed that there was an
implied term in an employment contract that the worker accept
risks on the job.46 The essence of an employment contract is that the
worker gives his labour to generate profits for his employer. If the
employer reaps the benefits, he should also bear the risk of loss. It
would therefore seem more appropriate that the implied term of the
employment contract should be that the worker will be fully compen-
sated for any work-related injury. The innovation of workers' com-
pensation is that employers are expected to respond on a collective
rather than an individual basis in the performance of this obligation.
The fact of financing by employers is a fundamental feature of
workers' compensation. It is a cost of production, a direct charge
upon industry.4
7
It is illegitimate in principle to argue that the Workers' Compensation
Board must tighten up on claims and cut back on benefits because its
total budget is growing too large, too fast, for the economy to afford
... the only proper means of containing the bill for accident losses is to
reduce the number of accidents themselves.48
The Workers' Compensation Act prohibits employers from passing
on the costs of assessments to their employees. 49 But this is probably
more a control of form than of substance.
Management, canvassing other options, will naturally analyse higher
workers' compensation premiums as an increase in its overall labour
costs ... In the final analysis I believe that compensation benefits are
paid not by capital but by labour, both as consumers of higher-priced
goods and as wage earners in an industry faced with increasing labour
costs in a competitive world ... workers' compensation is a vehicle
44. Id. at 11-12.
45. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 13.
46. Fleming, supra, note 1, at 478.
47. supra, note 43.
48. Weiler Report, supra. note 35 at 15-16.
49. S.N.S., 1968, c. 65, s. 18.
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through which able bodied workers share their income with their
disabled fellows.30
In reality, the question is not whether the full costs of compensation
will be paid, but how much of the cost must be born by the injured
worker himself.
A fundamental question is: "Compensation for what?' Workers'
compensation has always been primarily concerned with compensa-
tion for loss of earnings. This is the main battleground about the
nature of compensation awards. Nevertheless, issues of compensa-
tion for non-pecuniary losses and for cost of care are also basic to any
scheme of compensation. Furthermore, inasmuch as the aim is to
restore the worker as much as possible to his pre-injury situation,
issues ofjob security are closely intertwined with those of compensa-
tion. These various aspects of the compensation system will each be
examined in turn.
(A) Loss of Earnings
The basic thrust of workers' compensation is that it is aimed at
replacing lost wages, or at least some portion of lost wages. The
compensation for lost earnings is currently organized on the basis of
distinct categories of benefits, i.e. entitlement in case of death, per-
manent total disability, permanent partial disability, and temporary
disability (whether total or partial). The particular types of benefits
raise unique questions, but there are also matters common to all
types of benefits. These common questions will be addressed first.
(i) Periodic versus Lump Sum Payments
A preliminary issue, which is something of an aside, concerns the
mode of payment. One of the virtues of the fact that workers'
compensation is operated by an administrative board is that it is easy,
and indeed the norm, to make periodic payments to claimants. This
is a marked advantage over the system of tort liability, where per-
sonal injury damages are awarded on a once only, lump sum basis.
The lump sum award requires guesses, founded on actuarial evi-
dence, as to how long the plaintiff will live, or how long his disability
will last. But since actuarial predictions make no claim to accuracy in
individual cases, tort damages are awarded with an almost certain
knowledge that they are erroneously calculated. 51 Periodic payments
50. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 17-18, See also Select Committee Report, supra note
21 at 12.
51. Andrewsv. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. et al(1978), 83 D.L.R. 452 (S.C.C.) at 458.
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solve this problem by being capable of responding to actual occur-
rances. The courts have declared themselves incapable of awarding
periodic payments as tort awards without direction from the Legisla-
ture, because the courts do not have the administrative machinery to
handle them.32
Lump sum awards also require the courts to make projections far
into the future about inflation and return on investments that the
lump sum could earn.53 Periodic payments again avoid such guess-
work, and a response can be made to the inflation problem by
indexing benefits to the cost of living, as was done in Nova Scotia in
1973.54
Ordinarily a periodic payment is more appropriate, but there are
circumstances in which a lump sum is preferable. The Workers'
Compensation Board does currently have the power to commute a
periodic payment into a lump sum.55 Overall, as regards the method
of payment, the workers' compensation system is much more adap-
table and more appropriate than the comparable response by a court
to a tort claim. 5
6
(ii) Earnings Ceilings
Entitlement to workers' compensation is calculated on the basis of
the worker's pre-injury earnings. From the inception of the statutory
scheme a ceiling on average earnings has been imposed. In effect,
anyone actually earning more than the ceiling is deemed to be earning
only the level set by the ceiling. Initially, in 1915, the ceiling was set at
$1200 a year.57 At the time this was at the high end of the scale of
industrial wages.58 As general wage levels increased, changes in the
ceiling came more slowly. The first increase, to $1500, was not
adopted until 1937.59 After that changes became more frequent, and
in recent inflationary times, very frequent. The ceiling is no longer set
by the statute itself, but by regulation.60 The current ceiling is $15,000,
52. Id.
53. Id at 471-474.
54. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 38A, added by S.N.S. 1973 (2nd Sess.), c. 6; as am. by S.N.S.
1975, c. 63, s. 3.
55. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 42(1).
56. Where the administrative machinery works properly, the payment of claims is also
much faster from an administrative board than from a court.
57. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, s. 41. This was compared to a ceiling of $2000 in Ontario, Weiler
Report, supra, note 35 at 33.
58. Weiler Report, Id.
59. S.N.S. 1937, c. 37, s. 8.
60. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 51B, added by S.N.S. 1975, c. 43, s. 6; S.N.S. 1975, c. 63, s. 4.
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which is approximately the average industrial wage in Nova Scotia. 61
This means there are a significant portion of injured workers whose
earnings are underestimated because of the ceiling. The Select Com-
mittee Report recommends that the ceiling be raised to $19,000,62
without explaining how that figure was arrived at, and without
examining the question of whether, in principle, any ceiling is
justified.
Weiler does address this issue, and expresses considerable doubt
as to the conceptual rationale for a ceiling.63 As Weiler notes,
workers' compensation is not designed as a social assistance program
to keep its recipients above the poverty line; its analogue is tort
damages which have never questioned that actual earnings form the
basis of the calculation. If the objective is to replace lost earnings, a
ceiling is an anomaly. Weiler further notes that the impact of the
ceiling is far more acute on individuals than on the compensation
plan as a whole.
The justification for such restraint cannot be fiscal concern, since
there is something of an inverse relationship between high levels of
earnings and high levels of risk.64
Nevertheless, Weiler displays some caution about venturing into
an as yet untried system of compensation with no ceiling. Instead, he
proposes that a ceiling be retained, but that it be drastically increased
such that almost no one earns more than the ceiling. Weiler's sugges-
tion is a moving ceiling based on 250 percent of the average industrial
wage (currently $40,000) which would exceed the earnings of about
99 percent of Ontario's workers.65
The Ontario government has accepted this recommendation in
principle. 66 The provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British
Columbia and Quebec have also recently set relatively high ceilings
which are automatically adjusted. 67 Although there does not seem to
be a justification for any ceiling, if we must have one we should at
61. Employment earnings and hours, Statistics Canada, Catalogue, 72-002 Monthly
(May 1981): For the first three months of 1981 the figures for the industrial composite
average weekly earnings for Nova Scotia were about $288, which is approximately
$15,000 per year.
62. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 27-28.
63. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 34-36.
64. Id. at 35.
65. Id.
66. Government of Ontario, White Paper on the Workers' Compensation Act (Toronto,
1981) at 3.
67. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 34. The ceilings are 150 percent of the average
industrial wage in British Columbia and Quebec, which cover about 90 percent of
Workers' Compensation: The Historical Compromise Revisited 321
least ensure that its impact is minimized. The Select Committee's
recommendation of a ceiling of $19,000 a year falls far short of this
objective.
(iM) Gross or Net
The question of whether compensation benefits should be calculated
on the basis of gross or net pre-injury earnings was not addressed
when the workers' compensation scheme was introduced in 1915.
The reason was that there was then no difference; this was prior to the
introduction, on a "temporary" basis, of income tax in 1917. The
adoption of a system of income tax did not, however, result in a
change in the basis of calculating workers' compensation; the basis
continues to be gross earnings.
If workers' compensation benefits were taxed on the same basis as
employment income, there would be no complication involved in
paying compensation on the basis of gross earnings. It would not be
necessary to be concerned about the impact of tax if it fell equally on
the pre-injury earnings and the post-injury compensation which
substitutes for those earnings. And, from a practical standpoint, this
would be the easiest way to proceed.
Unfortunately, reality is more complicated. In fact, workers' com-
pensation benefits are not taxable income.68 Nor would it be a simple
procedure to make workers' compensation payments taxable, and
increase the amount payable to offset the impact of tax. The reason is
that the Income Tax Act is a federal act (provincial income tax also
being imposed on the basis of the federal act in all provinces except
Quebec), whereas workers' compensation is a provincial responsibil-
ity.69 It is not simply a matter of getting federal and provincial
governments to agree in principle to the taxation of workers' com-
pensation benefits. If workers' compensation benefits were taxed, the
federal government would reap a windfall. Any effort to increase
benefits to offset the impact of the tax would mean a net loss for the
provinces (either the government or the employer contributors).
workers; in Saskatchewan and Manitoba the ceiling is set so that only ten percent of
claimants have earnings above the ceiling. Weiler treats these two approaches as roughly
similar, without noting the distinction that the former is based on 90 percent of all wage
earners whereas the latter is based on 90 percent of injured workers, If We'ler's assutmnp-
tion about the relationship between salary level and incidence ofinjury is valid, the ceiling
under the Saskatchewan and Manitoba formulation would be lower.
68. S. 80(l)(b), Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, rep. &sub. by S.C. 1970-71-72, c.
63 as am.
69. This is true even in relation to the federally regulated labour sector, Workmen's
Compensation Boardv. Canadian Pacific Railway Company, [1920] A.C. 1984 (P.C.).
322 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Short of a complete rearrangement of fiscal relations between
Ottawa and the provinces, it is clear that workers' compensation
benefits will remain non-taxable income.70
As long as workers' compensation benefits are non-taxable, cer-
tain inequities result from the fat that benefits are based on pre-
injury gross earnings. The actual loss suffered by the worker is a loss
of his net, not his gross, earnings. The problem is not that anyone gets
in excess of his net pre-injury earnings in compensation; the less than
full compensation avoids this.71 The inequality is that the relative
amount of under compensation is unevenly distributed. A claimant
with no dependents, who is relieved of the greatest amount of tax,
gets a higher proportion of his net pre-injury income than does a
claimant with dependents. Compensation on the basis of gross earn-
ings arbitrarily imposes harsher treatment on claimants with fam-
ilies. 72
If this anomaly cannot be cured by taxing workers' compensation
benefits, the obvious alternative is to pay compensation benefits on
the basis of pre-injury net earnings. This is administratively more
complex than basing payments on gross earnings, but Quebec has
succeeded in implementing a net based scheme without too much
difficulty. 73 Weiler recommends that this approach be adopted in
Ontario, 74 a suggestion accepted in principle by the Ontario
70. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 38-29.
71. As will be discussed in detail in the following section, benefits have always been
considerably less than 100 percent of gross earnings; the current level is 75 percent. In
order for a ta-payer to hw'e an efft,.e ,ax. rate of 25 int te. t-o hama nt i , dof
less than 75 percent of gross earnings) a taxpayer with no dependents would require an
annual income of more than $23,000, and a taxpayer with a fully dependent spouse and
two fully dependent children would require an annual income in excess of $34,000 (judged
from current tax deduction tables forNova Scotia employees, S.O.R. 80/941, Table 402;
account was taken of C.P.P. and U.I. deductions). Since these incomes far exceed the
workers' compensation earnings ceiling, everyone is undercompensatedunder the present
scheme.
72. It should be noted that the Canadian approach in tort liability is to ignore the effect of
tax in non-fatal cases, Andrews v. Grand & Toy, supra, note 51 at 4 7 4-5. The rationale for
not deducting the tax from pre-injury earnings is that it is the earning capacity, a capital
asset, and not lost earnings that is being compensated. (This rationale is said not to apply
in fatal cases, Keizer v. Hanna, (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.)) The complication
faced in tort cases that is not faced in workers' compensation cases arises from the fact of a
lump sum payment in tort. In long term disability cases a lump sum is calculated on the
basis that the lump sum will earnincome. Although the lump sum itselfis not taxable, the
income it produces is. In addition to ignoring the tax on pre-injury earnings the courts
also ignore the tax on income from the award, (Andrews at 474-5). The net effect of
ignoring tax in both pre- and post-injury situations is very unclear.
73. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 39.
74. Iad at 40.
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government. 75 The Select Committee Report ignores this issue
entirely, but the net earnings approach is conceptually appealing. It is
also very closely intertwined with the question of what percentage of
pre-injury earnings should be paid in compensation benefits, to
which the discussion now turns.
(iv) Percentage Basis
As was noted earlier, at its inception, workers' compensation never
promised to replace alllost earnings. In the beginning compensation
amounted to 55 percent of average earnings76 (up to the ceiling). This
was increased to 60 percent in 1929,77 to 66 2/3 percent in 1937,78 to
70 percent in 1956, 79 and to 75 percent in 1959.80 There has been no
change since 1959.81
Are we not due for a further increase? The Select Committee
Report does not address this issue. It is hard to believe that its
members did not turn their minds to the question. One is left with the
suspicion that the Committee members made a conscious decision to
support no change, but found silence to be the easiest way to defend
that position.
Is there any reason why the basis of compensation should not be
100 percent? An argument that account must be taken of the inci-
dence of tax can be met by paying compensation on the basis of net
earnings, as discussed in the previous section. An argument that the
bargain struck in 1915 contemplated only partial replacement of lost
earnings should not be controlling in 1981. In the first place, since the
tort remedy has greatly expanded since 1915, a very comprehensive
system of workers' compensation is required to re-establish a balance
similar to that struck in 1915. In the second place, and more impor-
tantly, there is no particular reason why, in 1981, we must continually
refer back to a historical compromise fashioned two-thirds of a
century ago. Surely we have now reached the stage where workers'
75. White paper, supra, note 66, at 6-9.
76. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, s. 38, ff.
77. S.N.S. 1929, c. 45, ss. 2-5.
78. S.N.S. 1937, c. 37, ss. 3-8.
79. S.N.S. 1956, c. 49, s. 2.
90. S.N.S. 1959, c. 46, s. 7
81. Currently S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 3, ff. It should be noted that there is statutory
minimum for total disability, now based on 75 percent of the minimum wage, calculated on
a 40 hour week, s. 38B, added by S.N.S. 1973, c. 6, s. 3. (A minimum for partial disability
is also set corresponding to the degree of disability.) Also, a person on total permanent
disability with dependents is guaranteed further minimums (s.36). The notion of some
sort of statutory minimum was introduced early: S.N.S. 1917, c. 11, s. 1.
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compensation should be designed in accordance with what we think
public policy demands.
It is from this perspective that Weiler assesses the question of the
appropriate percentage. As discussed above, Weiler begins with an
ini6al assxamptionthaLht ivotal vosis no itascnfoy dty-ig:, Ud
workers 100 percent of compensation.82 But for other reasons, he
concludes that something less than total compensation should be
awarded; specifically he recommends that compensation should be
90 percent of net earnings.
83
Weiler's argument is that there must be a "modest" shortfall from
full compensation. His 90 percent figure would apply across the
board, i.e. to both total and partial disability, and to temporary and
permanent disability. However, he actually develops his argument in
the context of temporary total disability, and that seems to colour his
approach.
The essence of Weiler's argutntent is that sorxetting tess than t00
percent is required in order to provide an incentive to return to
work. 84 He concedes that a large gap to achieve this end would be an
unfair penalty on those unquestionably unable to work, but does
conclude that a modest gap is necessary.85 On reflection, this analysis
seems to break down, especially when looked at with reference to the
specific types of compensation benefits.
Looking firstly at permanent total disability, it does seem rather
inconsistent to award compensation on the basis that a claimant is
incapable of ever returning to work, and in the next breath indicate
that he needs an incentive to return to work. As regards partial
disability (whether temporary or permanent), the compensation
received must, by definition, be less than a claimant's pre-injury
earnings. It is only partial compensation. That, in itself, provides an
incentive to work. An additional incentive is not necessary.
86
The only circumstance in which an incentive to return to work
does, at first glance, seem appropriate is in the case of temporary total
disability, which is the context in which Weiler raises the issue.
82. Weler Report, supra, note 35 at 10-11.
83. Id at 40.
84. Id at 37-38 Weiler does not suggest that a worker would actually sustain an injuryto
get off work, but does suggest that after the event, a prod might be needed to get him to
return to work.
85. Id
86. Furthermore, Weiler himself offers a means of dealing with a partially disabled
claimant who is not working up to his potential. Weiler suggests that the Workers'
Compensation Board should have the power to deem that a claimant was receiving
income if he refused work he was capable of performing. (Id. at 62).
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However, there already is a powerful incentive to return to work- the
Board has the power to cut the claimant off if the Board concludes
that the person is fully recovered and able to return to work.87 In light
of this, it seems unfair to penalize the claimant who is in fact not yet
capable of returning to work. In principle, it seems preferable to let
the system tolerate a few malingerers, rather than penalize the
innocent.88
Weiler raises a subsidiary issue to the effect that able bodied
workers incur certain expenses that workers' compensation clai-
mants do not have. The argument is that 100 percent compensation
would actually improve the financial position of injured workers.8 9
Weiler cites specifically job related expenses such as transportation,
cafeteria meals, special clothing and day care. 90 There are a number
of responses to this point. A person on partial disability who is in fact
working will incur such expenses in the same way as his able bodied
co-workers. A workers' compensation claimant who is not working
would not incur these specific work related expenses but nor will he
get any tax deductions for them. In addition, a point which Weiller
himself notes,91 an injured worker may well face extra expenses
resulting from his disability. There is no particular reason to assume
that the net effect of these costs gives a net benefit to injured workers.
Weiler makes a further comment that an injured worker does not
have to sacrifice leisure time in order to work.92 Again, this would or
could only apply to total disability, but even where it could apply
Weiler himself offers the rejoinder that the disability itself is likely to
detract from that leisure time.93 It seems to be a very suspect argu-
ment for reducing compensation payments.9 4
In sum, there does not seem to be any real justification for paying
compensation amounting to anything less than 100 percent of pre-
injury net earnings.
87. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s:58(1); the Committee on the Weiler Study "The Weiler Report:
A step forward for injured workers?" fact sheet at 2.
88. It is not clear that a 10 percent reduction would be enough of a penalty to deter a
malingerer in any event.





94. Weileralso raises in this context the point that workers on total disability compensa-
tion are not subject to the threat of interruption of earnings due to illness, unemployment,
etc. This issue will be discussed in detail below, in a separate section: (vi) wage adjustments
and contingencies.
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(v) Collateral Benefits
The present act does make one reference to fringe benefits:
46(1) In fixing the amount of a weekly or monthly payment regard
shalt be had to any payment, allowance or benefit which the
worker may receive from his employer during the period of his
disability, including any pension, gratuity or other allowance
provided wholly at the expense of the employer.
(2) When the compensation is payable any sum deducted from the
compensation under subsection (1) may be paid to the employer
out of the Accident Fund.95
The corollary should be that any fringe benefits that the worker was
receiving before the injury which are not being maintained by his
employer during his disability should be replaced by the workers'
compensation scheme. The present act does not allude to this, nor
does the Select Committee Report refer to it. Weiler does, however,
comment upon the problem. He suggests that an employer be
required to maintain fringe benefits for any employee on temporary
disability, and that where a person becomes permanently disabled,
the Board should provide acceptable substitutes for these fringe
benefits, either in kind or through supplements to the basic pension.96
Weiler's approach is eminently sensible.
The issue of pre-injury fringe benefits is conceptually fairly easy to
grapple with. The question of collateral benefits, other than workers'
compensation benefits, which accrue as a consequence of the disabil-
ity is somewhat more problematic. Such collateral benefits, e.g.
insurance or pension benefits, can be either private or public. From a
practical and policy perspective, the latter, in the form of Canada
Pension Plan disability and survivor pensions, are the most significant.
The present approach in Nova Scotia is simply to ignore collateral
benefits, although it is not clear whether this is a conscious choice or a
function of the fact that the Canada Pension Plan was instituted long
after the workers' compensation scheme had become well entrenched.
The approach taken in tort cases is similarly to decline to make any
adjustments for collateral benefits, whether in respect of the Canada
Pension, 97 or private pension/insurance schemes. 98 The rationale is
that the plaintiff has paid for or otherwise earned the right to the
pension. If the contingency had not happened, he would not have
95. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 46, as am. by S.N.S. 1978-79, c. 38, s. 1(2).
96. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 44-45.
97. Canadian Pacific Ltd. et alv. Gillet al(1972), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 229 (S.C.C.) at 237-241.
98. Guy v. Trizec Equities Ltd. et al (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 243 (S.C.C.) at 247-248.
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reaped any benefit; where the contingency has now happened, his
rights under the plan should not be denied.
Weiler, however, takes a different approach. He is concerned
about the "stacking" of benefits, and recommends that any Canada
Pension Plan payments received should be fully deducted. 99 He deals
with the question on the footing that workers' compensation repres-
ents a full compensation of lost earnings, which is not in fact what he
is recommending. Where compensation is less than complete, it
seems illogical to object to a claimant receiving Canada Pension to
top off his workers' compensation benefits. But even if workers'
compensation were full compensation, Weiler's approach is ques-
tionable. He assumes that since the Canada Pension Plan is the more
generalized plan, (i.e. benefits are paid irrespective of the cause of
disability), workers' compensation schemes should be the last
insurer.100 The reverse agreement seems more appealing to the writer.
It is the scheme that provides the minimum floor for everyone that
should be the last insurer. If any deductions were to be made, it would
seem that the Canada Pension Plan should take account of workers'
compensation benefits, instead of the reverse. This is not, however,
being recommended. A person who has paid for his Canada Pension
benefits should not be deprived of them.'0' The argument accepted in
tort cases is viewed as compelling. Any overcompensation that
results can be rationalized on the basis that the worker has purchased
this right to overcompensation, even if by means of a compulsory
contributory pension scheme.
(vi) Wage Adjustments and Contingencies
Workers' compensation payments are paid on the basis of pre-injury
earnings. In compensating for lost earnings, the built-in assumption
is that the injured worker would have continued to earn the same
wage if he had not been injured. Especially in permanent disability
cases, this is clearly a significant distortion.
A very major element of wage adjustment is now accounted for in
Nova Scotia, because benefits have been indexed to the Consumer
99. Weier Report, supra, note 35 at 41-42. Weiler also suggestsitat supplementation of
workers' compensation benefits by private disability plans should be prohibited (at 42). It
is not at all clear why there need be any concern about private sector responses to
disability.
100. Id at 41.
101. See "The White Paper on Workers' Compensation, The Response of Injured
Workers" (Ontario Public Service Union, 1981) at 5-6.
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Price Index since 1973.102 Still, this does not take account of real
increases in wages that the injured worker would have enjoyed. Such
real increases could arise from either a general rise in real wage levels
in that industry, or from the advancement of the particular worker,
or both. Tort awards in long term personal injury cases do take such
factors into account, and do make an effort to project what the
average income of the plaintiff would have been, while admitting that
a large amount of guesswork is involved.
03
The Select Committee Report does not comment on this aspect;
Weiler does make a few references in passing. Weiler does not think
that, as a general rule, the Board should be asked to speculate about
such matters, although he does see some role:
But where there is an established job progression scheme or salary
grid encompassing the position actually occupied by the injured
worker, the Board should take this into account in calculating the
benefit which is intended to replace income lost as a result of the
injury. 104
Weiler offers no specific details as to how this would work.
Weiler also addresses this general issue, somewhat more indirectly,
when discussing escalation to deal with inflation. He suggests that it
might be more appropriate to index according to the increase in the
average wage, (recognizing that this would in some instances be
lower than the inflation rate). 05 This suggestion responds to the
realities of wage escalation of individual injured workers only in a
tangential way; the position of the individual worker may be far
removed from the average.
It is admitted that it would be administratively cumbersome to
build wage escalation factors into benefits on an individual basis, but
Weiler's suggestion that this be done only where a clear pattern exists
seems to represent unfair discrimination against others. Perhaps a
more appropriate solution would be for the Board to develop separ-
ate guidelines apropriate to particular job classifications, guidelines
that would be regularly adjusted and reflected in individual pension
awards (both past and present).
102. S.N.S. 1973, c. 6. There are still a few anomalies. As the Select Committee Report
(supra, note 21 at 27) points out, temporary total disability claims lasting more than ayear
do not currently benefit from indexing, The Select Committee recommends that this be
rectified. The Select Committee also recommends that pensions which began before 1973,
and were thus eroded by inflation prior to the adoption of indexing, should be adusted
upward to compensate (at 28).
103. Andrews v. Grand & Toy, supra, note 51 at 469.
104. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 45.
105. Id. at 74.
Workers' Compensation: The Historical Compromise Revisited 329
Another factor taken into account in tort awards which is not
considered in workers' compensation benefits is the notion of "con-
tingencies of life". The approach taken in tort cases is somewhat
arbitrary. A 20 percent reduction for contingencies is common, 10 6 but
the figure seems to be pulled out of the air. The basis for this
adjustment is
It is a general practice to take account of contingencies which might
have affected future earnings, such as unemployment, illness, acci-
dents, and business depression.'0 7
As Mr. Justice Dickson notes in Andrews, there seems to be a bias in
favour of the negative contingencies of life.108 There would not
appear to be a very good justification for taking account of such
contingencies in relation to workers' compensation benefits, since it is
such a speculative exercise. If account is to be taken at all, it should
simply be built into the adjustments made in respect of real wage
increases, discussed above.
In sum, it is being suggested that workers' compensation benefits
should be adjusted to take account of wage adjustments that injured
workers would have experienced. Some rough attempt should be
made to respond to individual circumstances. It is admitted that this
will be a very imprecise exercise, but the resulting distortion should
be less than that created by completely ignoring changes in real
wages.
(vii) Issues Relevant to Particular Types of Benefits
The preceeding discussion has concerned issues appeable, across the
different types of workers' compensation awards. Although there are
no other. particular issues which will be discussed in relation to
temporary total disability benefits, there are some specific issues that
should be raised in relation to permanent disability, partial disability,
and survivors' benefits.
(a) Permanent Disability
At present a person in receipt of a permanent total or permanent
partial disability pension receives the same basic pension for the rest
of his life.109 Weiler suggests that after a person reaches retirement
age, this is not exactly appropriate. If the point of the scheme is to
106. Andrews v. Grand & Toy, supra, note 51 at 470.
107. Id
108. Id
109. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, ss. 36(1), 38(1).
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replace lost income, at the stage of retirement, it should be replacing
lost retirement income. 110 The practical implication that must be
addressed is that lost retirement income would ordinarily be less than
lost wage income.
In principle, it is hard to argue with We'ler that at retirement age
the compensation should be for lost retirement income. However,
Weiler's argument does not seem to really hold unless the compensa-
tion for lost wage income was in fact complete, including compensa-
tion for lost wage increases. For if there was any under-compensation
in the pre-retirement years, a tolerance of some over-compensation in
the post retirement years should be the quid pro quo. It would be
almost impossible to make individual adjustments in this respect, so
if the statutory scheme admits of any underconipensation during
normal working years, the workers' compensation pension should
not be changed at retirement age.
But iftheytevefull zmtnfio lo wn agninmt, Wtl'f
notion of lost retirement income would probably have to be adopted.
What Weiler envisages is that the Board would contribute to the
employees former pension plans, both private and public, or if that
were not feasible, the Board would purchase R.R.S.P.'s to generate a
comparable annuity at age 65.111 This might create some administra-
tive difficulties, but it does seem sound in principle," 2 and it is more
analogous to the approach accepted as valid in tort cases."
3
Weiler actually only discusses this matter in respect of permanent
total disability. Conceptually, it should apply to permanent partial
disability as well.
(b) Partial Disability
The basis on which partial disabiity pensions are awarded is one of
the most contentious issues in workers' compensation. On the face of
it, the act appears to direct the Board to make a standard assessment
of lost earnings.
38(l) Where perrmanent partial disability results from the injury the
compensation shall be a weekly payment of seventy-five per cent
of the difference between the average weely earnings of the
110. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 45.
I11. Id.
112. It has been suggested that Weiler's approach ignores the fact that the disability
continues after age 65, Response of Injured workers, supra, note 101 at 6. In respect of lost
earnings, that is not really the point. It is, however, relevant in respect on non-pecuniary
losses, discussed below.
113. Guy v. Trizec, supra, note 98.
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worker before the accident and the average amount which he is
earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or
business after the accident, and such compensation should be
payable during the lifetime of the worker.114
In fact the system has very little to do with the measurement of lost
earnings. The workers' own pre-injury earnings form the basis of the
calculation, but the percentage award (i.e. the percentage of the 75
percent basis) does not often come very close to the actual impair-
ment of earning capacity.
The Compensation Board in this Province like most of the Boards in
Canada pays a pension to such individuals based upon an objective
disability evaluation schedule. Every person with the same injury
receives the same percentage pension ... The use of the 'Physical
Disability Evaluation Schedule' scornfully referred to by many as the
'meat chart' method .... 115
If the meat chart indicates that an injured worker has a disability of
50 percent, it matters not whether the worker is completely unable to
work, or is capable of returning to his old job. It is a loss of function
test rather than a loss of earnings test, and is unresponsive to the job
skills of individual claimants.
The issue arises in both temporary and permanent partial disabil-
ity, but it is obviously more crucial in relation to the latter. The result
of the meat chart method is that many claimants are grossly under-
compensated for their injuries, whereas other claimants are effec-
tively overcompensated. Average justice results in considerable injus-
tice for those who are undercompensated.
Both the Select Committee Reportll 6 and the Weiler Report" 7
strongly recommend that the meat chart approach be abandoned in
favour of compensation for actual wage loss. Since that is what
workers' compensation is designed to to in the first place, it is hard to
quarrel with that conclusion.
The Select Committee Report does not really explore the implica-
tions of such a change; Weiler does discuss this. Weiler notes that
administratively, a wage loss sytem requires a lot more work on the
part of the Board. It requires that the Board obtain information on
the claimant's post-injury actual earnings, and it leads logically to the
conclusion that the Board would deem that a person had post-injury
114. S.N.S. 1960, c. 65, s. 38(1), am by S.N.S. 1978-79, c. 38, s. 2(2).
115. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 24.
116. Id at 24-25.
117. Weler Report, supra, note 35 at 52-62.
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earnings in the event that an injured worker refused a suitable job
that he was capable of performing." 8 This would increase the
amount of administrative discretion exercised by the Board.
From the point of view of the injured worker, he loses his automatic
entitlement to a fixed pension which is independent of the bureau-
cratic favour of a Board already distrusted by many of these perman-
ently disabled workers. 19
On balance, however, the advantages of abandoning the meat chart
system seem to outweigh the disadvantages.
It is clear that the implications of a wage loss measure is that if
someone is capable of returning to his old job in spite of his work
caused disability, he would not get any compensation for loss of
earnings. If this seems harsh, it should be remembered that we are
here speaking only of compensation for loss of earnings. This conclu-
sion does not preclude compensation assessed on a different basis, as
will be discussed below in respect of non-pecuniary losses.
(c) Survivors' Benefits
Workers' compensation benefits are payable upon the death of the
worker both where the work related accident/disease is the imme-
diate cause of death, and where the work related accident/disease
results in a compensatory disability and that disability is in turn the
cause of death.
Where death results, compensation is payable to a spouse and to
other dependents of the deceased worker. Death benefits at least
cover funeral expenses (including transportation costs). 120 Where
there is a surviving spouse, a lump sum payment is made.' 2' But the
principal part of the compensation is periodic payments in respect of
the spouse, children and other dependents. 122 123 The benefits pay-
able on the death of a worker are currently as follows. 124
118. Id. at 62.
119. Id at 59.
120. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 30(a), as am.
121. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 30(b) (c), as am.
122. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 30(b)(c) (d) (e), as am.
123. Where a widow remarries, she loses the spouses' pension as such, but does get a
special payment upon remarriage. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 51, as am. by S.N.S. 1973, c. 6, s.
3.
124. Although there is currently no limit no matter how many dependents, there used to
be such a limit. The limit was abolished by S.N.S. 1965, c. 58, s. 3.
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Summary of Present Benefit Scales
(Effective January 1, 1981)
Spouse's pension ..................... *$ 395.00 month
Spouse's remarriage allowance .......... *$2,181.00
Widowsjwidowe's special allowance
following loss of spouse, in addition to
pension ............................ $1,000.00
Funeral expenses paid to ................ $ 750.00
Transportation of body ................. $ 300.00
Children's pension .................... *$ 84.00 per mo
Orphan's Pension ..................... *$
Other dependents' pension .............
......... ........... ........... *
nth each
and no limit as
to number of
children
109.00 per month each







*NOTE: These increases effective January 1, 1981 resulted from the provisions of Section
38A (1973 Amendment), whereby certain awards are increased in accordance with
changes in the Consumer Price Index.
Death benefits constitute an anomaly in that the amount of the
benefits is not a function of the deceased workers' previous earn-
ings; 125 benefits are paid in fixed sums according to different catego-
ries of dependents. If the rationale for workers' compensation is
replacement of lost earnings, fixed rate awards do not fit. If the
counter argument is that one man's life should not be valued more
highly than another's, why is it that it is permissable to value one
man's total disability more highly than another's? The point of
periodic payments under a workers' compensation scheme is to
replace lost earnings. Even if it is agreed that inequality of family
incomes is a problem in our society, survivors' benefits under
workers' compensation seem a very odd place to start a crusade.
Besides, the level of survivors' benefits is sufficiently low (unless there
are a very large number of dependents) that the fixed rate scheme
imposes equality at a very minimal level.
The response of the Select Committee to survivors' benefits is
rather unclear:
125. There is a nominal exception in that where the deceased worker was an officer or
shareholder of the company, the survivors benefits cannot exceed 75 percent of the
workers' prioraverage earnings. S.N.S. 1968, c. 68, s. 31. However, survivors' benefits are
simply too low for this provision to have any effect (unless the number of children is very
high).
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With respect to permanent pensions we therefore suggest that:
awards should be based on the workers' loss of earnings arising out of
the accident and not just on the loss of body function
This committee also recommends:
dependents. 26
Is the latter point an oblique reference to survivors' benefits? Later in
the report, the Committee does assume that it has already addressed
survivors' benefits:
This committee has as previously indicated adopted the principle that
future claims should be dealt with on the basis of loss of earnings for
the claimant or in the case offatalities on the loss of expectation of
earnings. Adjustments however are necessary at this time for surviv-
ing spouses as well as dependents and permanent pensioners.
This committee recommends that:
the pension to surviving spouses be increased to $425 per month and
for each dependent to $110 per month. 27 (emphasis added)
It is not at all clear whether that last recommendation refers to
current cases only, or to both current and future cases.
Weiler does make clear that he favours an approach based on the
lost income from the deceased worker, rather than fixed sum
awards. 28 Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec
have all recently moved to adopt this principle. 129 The approach is a
sound one.
The adoption of the approach that survivors' benefits should be
based on the loss of earnings does not, however, settle all the issues.
As is the case when damages are awarded under the Fatal Injuries
Act, 30 account should in principle be taken of the fact that the
deceased worker no longer has to pay for his own living expenses.'
3'
Alberta now awards a workers' compensation benefit equivalent to
what would have been awarded if he had suffered permanent total
disability. 32 Where compensation is less than full in the first place,
this would probably not result in overcompensation to the surviving
family.133 But if the total permanent disability pension were indeed
126. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 25.
127. Id. at 28.
128. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 46-48.
129. Id.
130. R.SN.S. 1967, c. 100.
131. See, e.g. Keizer v. Hann, supra, note 72.
132. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 47.
133. If there were less than complete compensation in order to provide an incentive to
return to work, that clearly has no application in respect of a deceased worker.
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full compensation, this would result in some overcompensation. The
approach should either be to award some portion of the total per-
manent disability pension (perhaps 90 percent), or to award 100
percent, acknowledging that there is an element of non-pecuniary
loss built into the pension.
Weiler raises a further issue in relation to young spouses with no
dependents. He argues that the notion of the dependence of such
persons should be reassessed. He proposes a rather complex scheme
of taking age and presence of dependent children into account in
assessing whether a spouse should receive a periodic pension, and if
so, how much. 34 It probably is realistic to take such factors into
account, but it is difficult in principle to decide how. Such an effort
will not be undertaken here. 35
In sum, it is suggested that there should be a fundamental change
in survivors' benefits from fixed sum periodic payments to periodic
payments related to the pre-injury earnings of the deceased worker.
Several questions still remain, however, as to details of how such a
change should be implemented.
(B) Non-Pecuniary Loss
When it was instituted in 1915 the workers' compensation system was
specifically designed not to include compensation for non-pecuniary
loss. It was not that non-pecuniary loss was judged inappropriate in
principle as a basis for compensation, but rather it reflected the
determination that the scheme was only designed to provide partial
compensation. That was supposed to be part of the bargain, some-
thing that workers would have to give up to be granted a comprehen-
sive scheme of workers' compensation. But even in 1915 there was
some implicit recognition of compensation for non-pecuniary losses,
specifically in respect of permanent partial disability.
39(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section 1, where in the
circumstances the amount which the workman is able to earn
after the accident has not been substantially diminished, the
Board may nevertheless recognize an impairment in earning
capacity, and may allow a lump sum in compensation.136
134. Weller Report, supra, note 35 at 48-5 1.
135. Weiler also proposes a vastly increased lump sum payment in respect of death
benefits Id This will be discussed in the next session.
136. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, s. 39(2).
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The present section 38(2) is in very similar terms, although the
references to "substantially" and to a lump sum have been dropped. 137
This seems to say that even though there is no loss of earnings, there
will be compensation. Although the compensation is really for pain
and suffering, it is not politic to make such an adinisssion explicitly.
The Select Committee Report does not provide any elaboration
on the matter of pain and suffering, or other non-pecuniary losses
(loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life). On the other hand,
Weiler makes extensive comments. He confronts the question in the
context of permanent partial disability. The issue is impossible to
ignore when considering the case of a worker who has suffered a
permanent disability, e.g. the loss of a limb, but who has not suffered
any loss of earnings. It seems extremely harsh to tell such a person that
his loss is not deserving of any compensation at all. It appears to be
widely accepted that this is not the appropriate response. 38 Weiler
suggests that we should not hesitate to compensate for such a loss,
and not hesitate to label it as compensation for non-pecuniary loss. 39
Of course it would be illogical to make such a payment only to those
who suffer no loss of earnings, if compensation for pain and suffer-
ing, etc. is to be awarded, it must be awarded to all.
Weiler makes the initial point that it makes no sense to base an
award for pain and suffering on the person's previous earnings. 40
Although awards not related to loss of earnings do have some
relationship to the problems of returning to work, 14 1 they are primar-
ily given to compensate for loss of enjoyment of life outside the job
context. In respect of non-pecuniary loss, the "meat chart" approach,
assessing loss of function, does make some modicum of sense.14'
Weiler's proposed solution is a lump sum payment to be given to
workers in addition to any compensation payable in respect of loss of
earnings. 43 This is also the approach adopted under Saskatchewan's
new statutory scheme.144 The Select Committee Report does not say so
137. S.N.S. 1968, c. 35, s. 38(2).
138. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 55.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 56.
141. E.g. even if an injured worker were able to return to his old job, it might be more
difficult, or create greater risks, or affect his job mobility. Response of Injured Workers,
supra, note 101 at 3.
142. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 55. However, it should be remembered that persons
with different interests and activities will be differently affected by the same loss of
function.
143. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 55.
144. S.S. 1979, c. W-17.1, s. 67.
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explicitly, and indeed makes no reference to lump sum payments, but
it did apparently have the Saskatchewan model in mind. 145 It is not
entirely clear why a lump sum is deemed appropriate. It is true that
lump sums are awarded in tort for non-pecuniary loss, but that is
only because there is no alternative. Since, for example, a permanent
disability is going to last for the rest of the worker's life, why should
not the compensation be co-extensive, i.e. by means of a non-income
related periodic pension? 146 If a claimant preferred a lump sum, he
could choose that option, and have a pension commuted, 47 but in
principle, a periodic payment seems conceptually more attractive.
The result is that a person's periodic pension could have two compo-
nents: one based on his previous income, and one totally unrelated to
his previous income.
Assuming a periodic pension in respect of non-pecuniary loss
would be something more than a token amount, it would mean that
the scheme of compensation could provide a significant remedy even
to those who could show little or no loss of earnings. This would not
only afford a response to cases in which the injured worker is capable
of performing his formerjob or one comparable to his formerjob. If
the system, in respect of loss of earnings, were to embrace the concept
of loss of retirement earnings, a periodic pension for non-pecuniary
loss would ensure that a worker injured shortly before retirement age
would not be shortchanged by the scheme. Even if he received little
compensation for loss of earnings, he would still be entitled to more
than nominal compensation.
In terms of the amount of compensation that should be paid in
respect of non-pecuniary loss, there is no particular principle which
points to an appropriate response. An award is, by definition almost,
arbitrary.148 Although neither the Weiler Report nor the Saskatche-
wan response considers periodic payments, the stipulations as to
lump sum amounts give some indication of what degree of recogni-
tion is to be extended to non-pecuniary loss. Weiler suggests that the
maximum lump sum award, i.e. for the most serious disability, be
145. Comment by Gordon Gillis, counsel to the Select Committee, made at employment
law seminar, Dalhousie Law School, November 22, 1981.
146. Weiler suggests that adjustments be made to the lump sum according to the age of
the claimant; (Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 56-57). However, this seems to be a very
inexact way to respond to the fact that some claimants will suffer their disability for a
longer period than others. A life-long periodic pension gives a direct response to this
factor.
147. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 42(1).
148. Andrews v. Grand & Toy, supra, note 51 at 475-478.
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pegged at the wage ceiling, currently $40,000.149 It is not clear why the
wage ceiling is appropriate, or even relevant - in truth the figure seems
to be taken out of the air. The Saskatchewan maximum, which is
apparently the model looked upon favourably by the Select Commit-
tee,150 is much smaller, a sum of $10,000.151 Indeed, that Saskatche-
wan figure seems to be downright niggardly, particularly when com-
pared to tort awards. In Andrews v. Grand & Toy the Supreme
Court of Canada adopted a conventional figure of $100,000 as the
normal maximum for non-pecuniary loss. That figure was chosen as
representing a modest response, with the explanation that it was
legitimate to take aggregate costs into account in assessing non-
pecuniary loss. 152 Such a reserve could apply equally to workers'
compensation. But while it is fair to avoid extravagance in compen-
sation for non-pecuniary loss, the compensation should be signifi-
cant enough that recognition is given to the fact that severely injured
claimants have suffered a real and substantial loss apart from loss of
earnings. 53 The response by the workers' compensation scheme
should be comparable to that given in tort awards.
Weiler presents a strong argument that the time has come for the
workers' compensation scheme to expressly make allowances for
non-pecuniary losses. In reality, the scheme has been doing so since
the beginning, but on a very uneven basis. Whatever the excuse once
was for overlooking non-pecuniary loss, it no longer is valid. If the
overall principle of full compensation is accepted, compensation for
non-pecuniary loss logically follows. Furthermore, that compensa-
tion should constitute more than a token response.
(C) Costs of Care
Initially, the response of workers' compensation to the costs of care,
principally medical costs, was extremely limited. The focus of the
scheme was on replacement of lost earnings. Anything else was
decidedly of secondary importance. There was only one provision in
the 1915 act relevant to costs of care, and the underlying "guardian of
the fund" mentality was made quite explicit.
149. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 55.
150. Comment by Gordon Gillis, supra, note 145.
151. S.S. 1979, c. -17.1, s. 67.
152. Andrews v. Grand & Toy, supra, note 51 at 476-477.
153. Weiler suggests that in fatal cases the surviving spouse should be given a substantial
lump sum in addition to any periodic pension granted; (Weiler Report, supra note 35 at
49-50). To a large extent, he appears to be suggesting compensation for non-pecuniary
loss. Again, this raises the question whether it should be in the form of a lump sum or a
periodic payment.
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45(3) Where in any case, in the opinion of the Board it will conserve the
accident fund to provide a special surgical operation or other
special medical treatment for a workman, and the furnishing of
the same by the Board is, in the opinion of the Board, the only
means of avoiding heavy payment for permanent disability, the
expense of such operation or treatment may be paid out of the
accident fund. 154
The well-being of the injured worker seemed totally irrelevant. Grad-
ually, however, the scope of coverage of costs of care was expanded.
In 1919 provisions were introduced to cover medical care services
during the 30 days after the disability was sustained.155 In 1927 a
provision was added whereby the Board could pay, for one year, the
costs and repair of an artificial limb, if this would lessen the disabil-
ity. 156 In 1929 apparatus and spectacles were added to this provi-
sion, 157 and in 1937 dental appliances were included.158 In 1934 the
medical services provisions were altered such that the 30 days of care
could be any time within 60 days from the date of disability. 59 Three
years later this was altered to stipulate that medical services could be
provided for a period of more than 30 days if this were beneficial to
the claimant and would preserve the accident fund.160 Finally, in 1944
both the 30 day limit on provision of medical services, and the one
year time limit on the supply and repair of devices were removed. 161
At last there was a general right to medical services and devices
financed by the Workers' Compensation Board. The advent of hospi-
tal insurance and medicare have not affected this basic concept.
Medical costs are still paid by the Workers' Compensation Board.' 62
More recently other innovations in respect of costs of care have
been introduced. In 1961 provisions for a helpless allowance first
appeared. 163 The current provisions for the helpless allowance are as
follows:
60(4) Where a worker is rendered helpless through permanent total
disability and the Board is satisfied that the worker requires
treatment, service, or attendance as a result of the disability, the
154. S.N.S. 1915, c. 1, s. 45(3).
155. S.N.S. 1919, c. 61, s. 8.
156. S.N.S. 1927, c. 38, s. 2.
157. S.N.S. 1929, c. 44, s. S.
158. S.N.S. 1937, c. 37, c. 1.
159. S.N.S. 1934, c. 33, s. 2.
160. S.N.S. 1936, c. 37, s. 2.
161. S.N.S. 1944, c. 36, s. 2.
162. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 60(1), as am. by S.N.S. 1972, c. 59, s. 2.
163. S.N.S. 1961, c. 51, s. 5.
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Board shall make an allowance of three hundred dollars per
month for such treatment, services or attendance or, if the allo-
wance is inadequate, may provide such treatment, services or
attendance. 6
Although there is a-thority to exceed $3 per month, the -wording of
the statute makes it quite obvious that there is a presumption against
this. There is no clearly established principle that the Board is to
ensure that every effort is made to provide the claimant with what-
ever care he reasonably requires. A recent tort award for a quadra-
plegic, accepting that home care was the appropriate type of care,
made an allowance for the cost of future care (including basic living
costs) in excess of $4,000 a month.165 In that context, a helpless
allowance of $300 a month looks quite limited indeed.
The Workers' Compensation Act also provides for a clothing
allowance, first introduced in 1970.166 The current provision reads as
60(4) The Board may allow to an injured worker, who because of the
nature of an injury in respect of which he has received compensa-
tion wears a prosthetic device or full-length brace or is a para-
plegic or quadraplegic, or is comfined to a wheel chair, an addi-
tional clothing allowance to compensate for the additional
deterioration of clothes not exceeding three hundred and fifty
dollars per year.
67
Beyond the provision of basic medical services and necessary
devices, the response of the workers' compensation scheme to the
costs of care of an injured worker remains quite limited. It is clear
fxt)m tt st ivcture, of Aht staww-y svktmt that vzostsf tay ayt
very much secondary to the objective of replacing lost income. The
contrast with the approach recently adopted by the Supreme Court
of Canada in personal injury tort claims is marked. The Supreme
Court has made it plain that ensuring that the injured person receives
adequate personal care is the most important objective that the court
must meet.1 68 Under workers' compensation, concern for the costs of
164. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65,s. 60(4), rep & sub by S.N.S. 1978-79, c. 38, s. 7, as am. by S.N.S.
1981, c. 46, s. 2(1). The select committee recommended this increase to $300 per month,
Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 25.
165. Andrews v. Grand & Toy, supra, note 51.
166. S.N.S. 1970, c. 70, s. 6.
167. S.N.S. 1968, c. 65, s. 60(4), added by S.N.S. 1978-79, c. 38, s. 7, as am. by S.N.S.
1981, c. 46, s. 2(2). The Select Committee recommended this increase to $350 per year.
Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 26.
168. Arnoldet alv. Teno et al(1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (S.C.C.) at 630.
Workers' Compensation: The Historical Compromise Revisited 341
a claimant's care is an afterthought, and there is no direction to the
Board to systematically assess a claimant's needs. Such an oversight
warrants correcting.
(D) Job Security
At first glance, the issue of job security might seem to be a matter
quite independent of any notion of compensation. But if compensa-
tion is viewed in its broadest context, i.e. as restoring, as best as can be
done, the claimant to his pre-disability position, the issue of job
security is clearly very relevant.
At present the workers' compensation legislation is silent about the
right of an injured worker to return to the job. For someone who is
permanently and totally disabled, the issue is not a real one. But for
persons temporarily or partially disabled, the question is one of
enormous practical importance. Since they have no rights deriving
from their status as workers' compensation claimants, they must
look to the rights of injured or sick workers generally.
At common law permanent illness is taken as amounting to
frustration of the employment contract. 69 A person suffering from a
permanent partial disability, unable to perform his old job but
capable of performing other tasks, has no actual right to an alternate
job with his employer. 170 However, in instances of temporary illness
or disability, where the employee is later capable of returning to his
old job, the situation is quite different at common law. The employ-
ment contract is not frustrated by temporary absence due to illness;
the contract subsists during the period of the illness.17' Since the
employee has never lost his job, he does not have to get it back.
Temporary absence due to illness or injury is not just cause for
summary dismissal. 72 Nevertheless, this body of law assists the
injured worker only up to a point. Absence of just cause does not
preclude dismissal; as long as notice (or payment in lieu) is given, the
employee can be dismissed. 173 If the required notice is of any signifi-
cant length, this might provide disincentive to the employer to dis-
miss, but this amounts to a very uncertain assurance of job security.
169. Della Risley, "An Introduction to the Position of Sick Employees in Nova Scotia,"
(1979) 2 Dal. L. J. 418 at 420.
170. Id at 427.
171. Id at 420.
172. Id at 423.
173. The period ofnotice would run, not from the date the employee took sick, but from
the date the employer informed the employee that he was not wanted back on the job.
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Employees covered by collective agreements, assuming there is the
standard clause prohibiting dismissal without just cause, are in a
much better position. Arbitration cases hold that a single period of
absence due to illness, even if quite lengthy, does not constitute just
cause for dismissal.1 4 Furthermore, depending on the wording of the
particular collective agreement, an injured worker unable to perform
his old job might be entitled to be assigned to alternate work by his
employer. 175
Turning to statute law, the Canada Labour Code does offer some
protection to workers under federal jurisdiction.
61.4(1) No employer shall dismiss or lay off an employee solely because
of absence due to illness or injury if
(a) the employee has completed three consecutive months of con-
tinuous employment by the employer prior to his absence;
(b) the period of absence does not exceed twelve weeks or the
period during which an employee is undergoing treatment and
rehabilitation at the expense of a workers' compensation
authority; and
(c) the employee, if requested in writing by the employer within
fifteen days after his return to work, provides the employer with
a certificate of a qualified medical practitioner certifying that
the employee was incapable of working due to illness or injury
for a specified period of time, and that period of time coincides
with the employee's absence from work. 176 (emphasis added)
The exact implications of s. 61.4(1), particularly subsection (b), are
unclear. A workers' compensation claimant could presumably rely
on the longer period under subsection (b), but if he has to rely on the
second branch of the subsection, certain difficulties may arise. The
"and" between treatment and rehabilitation may be a limitation, and
the subsection does not appear to cover a period of convalescence.
This latter point may well exclude a large number of workers'
compensation claimants. It is also very doubtful that section 61.4(1)
would cover a situation where an employee was no longer capable of
performing his old job but was capable of undertaking alternate
174. Re United Automobile Workers and Massey-Ferguson Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 370
(Weiler). The situation is more ambiguous in respect of a series of absences due to illness,
where just cause might be found. Thus an injured worker who had returned to work but
was forced to miss work from time to time because of the continuing effects of his
disability might be subject to dismissal, characterized as "non-disciplinary."
175. Re United Automobile Workers, Local 399, and Anaconda American Brass Ltd.
(1966), 17 L.A.C. 289 (Arthurs).
176. Canada Labour Code, Part III, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 64.1(1), added by S.C.
1977-78, c. 27, s. 21.
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work for the same employer. The "solely" in the beginning of the
subsection would probably give the employer an excuse to circum-
vent the section. Nevertheless, the section does offer some protection,
including some special protection to workers' compensation clai-
mants. As for the remedy, if the employer were convicted of a
violation of section 61.4, the convicting court would have the power
to order reinstatement under section 71(2).177 Dependence on the
conviction of the employer is, however, a very impractical remedy. If
resort could be had to section 61.5,178 the section allowing adjudica-
tors to reinstate employees dismissed without just cause, the
employee would be more likely to get a remedy. The difficulty is that,
by virtue of section 61.5(l)(3), section 61.5 cannot be used if there is
an alternate procedure for redress, such that section 71(2) may
preclude resort to section 61.5. There are no cases to date on this
point under section 61.5.179
While all of the above does offer some job security to injured
workers, it is very spotty (especially given the limited number of
workers governed by the Canada Labour Code). Also, little or no job
security is available to an injured worker unable to perform his
former job but capable of undertaking alternate work for his
employer. This is in fact the thorniest aspect of the job security issue
as it effects workers' compensation claimants. In order that job
security concerns of workers' compensation claimants be adequately
addressed, specific legislation is required.
The Select Committee Report, in addition to offering some gen-
eral recommendations about rehabilitation and vocational training,
makes the following recommendations concerning job security:
Emphasis must be placed on programs to encourage employers to
hire workers who may have been injured and sustained disability.
This means that:
Legislation to be introduced to protect the workers' job while the
worker is on compensation benefits so that he can return to his
previous employment when he may recover and is physically capable
of performing his former duties.
177. Canada Labour Code, Part III, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 71(2).
11S. Canada Labour Code, Part 111, R.S.C. 197, c. L-1, s. 61.5, added by S.C. 1911-1%,
c. 26, s. 21, as am. by S.C. 1980-81, c. 46, s. 27.
179. Given the narrow scope given by the courts to section 67A of the Nova Scotia
Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972,s. 67A, added byS.N.S. 1975,c. 50, s. 4, as am. by
S.N.S. 1976, c. 41, s. 15, the parallel to section 61.5, and given the absence of any
equivalent to section 61.4 in the Nova Scotia act, it is questionable that s. 67A would be
used to reinstate a person dismissed because of absence due to illness.
344 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Also:
Programs must be devised to encourage employers to give injured
workers priority in filling new positions. To do this it may be that
commonly accepted seniority principles will have to be compromised
where there are new jobs which the former claimant is able to fill. 180
This does create a full right to thejob where the worker is capable of
returning to his formerjob, 181 but it fals far short of a positive right to
alternate work if the employee is not capable of performing his
former job. Weiler also shies away from a full right to an alternate
job, 182 but he goes further than the Select Committee. Weiler suggests
that where an employer refuses to offer an available alternate job,
(not confined to a vacant alternate job), he would face a penalty of
increased assessment.183 This seems to be a fair response, but a
stronger response would be possible. It is not disputed that an
employee should not have a right to ajob if there is no actual job that
he can perform. But it would be possible to impose a primafacie
obligation on the employer to hire back the injured worker, leaving
an onus on the employer to satisfy the Workers' Compensation
Board that no suitable job exists. Such a provision should be com-
plimented by a general obligation on employers to hire workers'
compensation claimants (present or former), even if not formerly
employed by them.
184
The Select Committee refers to the problem of employer reluc-
tance to hire persons who have previously filed workers' compensa-
tion claims. Their only suggestion, however, concerns adjustments to
assessments levied against employers.185 Weiler suggests a more con-
crete step, which is quite appropriate. He recommends a statutory
prohibition against employer discrimination against employees who
have ever filed a claim for or received workers' compensation
benefits. 186
Statutory reform of workers' compensation legislation is necessary
to give injured workers meaningful job security protection. This is a
very important right for injured workers. Sustaining an injury on the
job imposes enough suffering on the employee. Whenever possible,
180. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 21.
181. Weiler also makes this recommendation, Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 65.
182. Id
183. Id at 64.
184. It might also be desirable to place a special obligation on eaployers to hire workers
who were injured in the employ of another employer of the same class.
185. Select Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 72.
186. Weiler Report, supra, note 35 at 64.
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the worker should be spared the added difficulty of loss of ajob. The
statutory response on this question should be firm and clear.
V. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has canvassed a wide range of issues related
to the basis on which workers' compensation benefits are paid.
Although it is not disputed that, in principle, a scheme of workers'
compensation is a good thing, and it is suggested that the coverage of
workers' compensation should be broadened to cover essentially all
workers, 87 there are some serious deficiencies with the present
scheme.
Some of those deficiencies have recently been investigated by a
Select Committee of the Legislature. The Select Committee has sug-
gested a number of important reforms, but has also ignored some
fundamental questions. The report in total falls far short of a recom-
mendation of full compensation for injured workers. The recent
report of Professor Paul Weiler, concerning the scheme of workers'
compensation in Ontario, is a much more in depth analysis. While
certain disagreements with some of Weiler's recommendations were
expressed in this paper, some of them being very fundamental dis-
agreements, there can be no doubt that the Weiler Report represents
a very useful and important perspective on workers' compensation.
It has been two-thirds of a century since the scheme of workers'
compensation was born of historical compromise. That surely
represents enough of a time span to allow for a reassessment of that
compromise. The essence of the compromise was that workers gave
up their right to sue their employers in tort in exchange for the right,
on a no fault basis, to workers' compensation which promised partial
compensation for work-related injury. Since that bargain was struck
tort liability has greatly expanded in scope. The alternative that
workers were required to forego in 1915 is now a much more
formidable remedy than it was at that time. In contrast, workers'
compensation has changed very little in the interim. That in itself
would provide sufficient justification to substantially upgrade
workers' compensation. But that is not the only basis for suggesting a
major overhaul. The time has come to detach ourselves from the
historical compromise, and to ask what, from a public policy per-
187. At present there are a significant number ofoccupations excluded from coverage of
the act, the most noteable being farm workers, domestics, and outworkers, S.N.S. 1968, c.
65, s. 2(2).
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spective, a scheme of workers' compensation should provide. The
response given in this paper is that workers' compensation should
providefull compensation of work-related injuries.
At the end of his report Weiler poses the question whether workers
should be given back the right to sue employers in tort, as an
alternative to workers' compensation. He responds in the negative.188
With respect, I would suggest that Weiler asked the wrong question.
If the workers' compensation system did what it ought to do, i.e.
provide full compensation, the question of the right to sue in tort
would become irrelevant because tort liability would not yield any
advantage. Workers' compensation would, as it should, provide a
remedy equal to that offered by tort liability. The alternative fore-
gone would not be worth resurrecting.
The Nova Scotia government may soon introduce a revamped
scheme of workers' compensation. The extent to which it will
embrace the concept of full compensation for injured Wokers will, in
large part, provide a measure of the adequacy of the legislative
response.
188. Weler Report, supra, note 35 at 134-137.
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